Where data leaks on a phone — and what to wipe

security · folio

In one line: Putting the token in the Keychain secures one copy. The OS makes more copies for you: the keyboard learns what is typed, the app switcher photographs the screen, URLCache writes API responses to Cache.db, logs, backups, the pasteboard, notifications, Spotlight and your SDKs keep theirs. MASVS-STORAGE-2 (“prevents leakage”) and PLATFORM-3 (“UI used securely”) are about those copies — and logout must delete every one.

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Where data leaks on a phone — and what to wipe — figure 1

The mechanisms

  • Keyboard: autocorrect / predictive text learn from non-secure fields. Secret → isSecureTextEntry (no copy; system keyboard only; no learning(unverified)). Sensitive but visible (IBAN, card) → autocorrectionType = .no, spellCheckingType = .no. Block custom keyboards: shouldAllowExtensionPointIdentifier → false for .keyboard. Android: flagNoPersonalizedLearning.
  • Snapshot: Apple — after the background delegate returns, UIKit takes the image shown in the switcher and at relaunch. Hide it in sceneDidEnterBackground; SwiftUI: overlay unless scenePhase is .active.
  • Capture: iOS only tells you — userDidTakeScreenshotNotification (after the fact); UIScreen.isCaptured (iOS 11, deprecated in 27) → sceneCaptureState trait (iOS 17) for recording + mirroring. Android FLAG_SECURE blocks screenshots, recording and the Recents thumbnail; 14 detects screenshots, 15 recording.
  • URLCache: URLSession.shared caches cacheable responses in memory + on disk. Fix at the source (no-store), or per session (.ephemeral: nothing on disk), or per response (willCacheResponse → nil).
  • Backups: Documents + Library (not Caches/tmp) go to iCloud / Finder; Keychain items restore to another device unless …ThisDeviceOnly. isExcludedFromBackup is for caches/support files — Apple: edits to user documents can reset it. Android: allowBackup defaults true (Auto Backup, 25 MB/app, Google Drive); 12+: dataExtractionRules splits <cloud-backup> / <device-transfer> — allowBackup="false" may not stop device-to-device transfer.
  • Pasteboard: setItems(_:options:) + .localOnly (no Universal Clipboard) + .expirationDate. iOS 16+ prompts before a programmatic paste (UIPasteControl doesn’t). Android 13+: EXTRA_IS_SENSITIVE hides the preview.

Example — the logout wipe (server first, then every copy)

func logOut() async {
  try? await api.revokeSession()   // refresh token + push token
  Keychain.deleteAll(service: "auth")          // SecItemDelete
  URLCache.shared.removeAllCachedResponses()   // Cache.db
  HTTPCookieStorage.shared.removeCookies(since: .distantPast)
  await WKWebsiteDataStore.default().removeData(
    ofTypes: WKWebsiteDataStore.allWebsiteDataTypes(),
    modifiedSince: .distantPast)               // WebView store
  UserDefaults.standard.removePersistentDomain(
    forName: Bundle.main.bundleIdentifier!)
  try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: userDir)  // DB, drafts
  imageCache.clearDisk(); memoryCaches.removeAll()
  try? await CSSearchableIndex.default()
            .deleteAllSearchableItems()        // Spotlight
  UIPasteboard.general.items = []   // only if WE put a secret there
  router.reset()                    // no stale screens in memory
}

Put per-user data under one directory (+ one App Group folder for extensions) so “delete the user” is one call — then test it: log out, grep the container.

Also leaks

Android accessibility services read the screen · exported content providers · App Group containers + widgets · WebView form data · the state-restoration archive (same rule as the snapshot).

Traps

  • “The token is in the Keychain, done” — the response that carried it may sit in Cache.db, a log line, a crash breadcrumb.
  • Covering the UI in applicationWillTerminate — not called on suspend; the snapshot follows sceneDidEnterBackground.
  • “We block screenshots on iOS” — you can’t; detect, and hide while captured.
  • Library/Caches is not backed up but is still on the device — a filesystem dump reads it.
  • Logout that only drops the in-memory token: the refresh token still works server-side.
  • RN: AsyncStorage is a plain unencrypted store — never tokens.

Remember

“Seen, stored, sent.” Every secret has copies the user sees (screen, keyboard, clipboard), the OS stores (cache, logs, backups) and SDKs send. Logout = server revoke + delete every copy.

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