Supply-chain security — from a maintainer's laptop to your app

security · folio

In one line: Your app ships code from hundreds of people you never vetted, and a package manager runs some of it at install time. Attackers go for the weakest link: a maintainer account (phishing, stolen token), a look-alike name, an install script, a public name shadowing a private one. Defence is layered: pin (lockfile + npm ci), delay (release cooldown), don’t execute (no dependency scripts), verify (provenance), inventory (SBOM) and rehearse the response. OWASP Mobile Top 10 (2024) M2.

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Supply-chain security — from a maintainer's laptop to your app — figure 1

Incidents to name (all verified)

Jun 2025@react-native-aria/* + @gluestack-ui/utils (17 pkgs, ∼1 M/week): leaked maintainer token without 2FA; RAT appended to lib/index.js past the viewer’s width
8 Sep 2025chalk, debug + 16 more (∼2 bn/week): maintainer phished via npmjs.help “update your 2FA”; browser crypto-drainer
Sep 2025Shai-Hulud worm: steals npm/GitHub/cloud tokens, republishes the victim’s other packages; 500+ pkgs (CISA alert)
Nov 2025Shai-Hulud 2.0: preinstall hook, ∼800 pkgs, 25k+ GitHub repos; may wipe home dir
Mar 2026react-native-international-phone-number, react-native-country-select: preinstall, Solana-memo C2, skips Russian locales
31 Mar 2026axios 1.14.1 / 0.30.4: maintainer PC compromised; added dependency plain-crypto-js dropped a RAT on install; published by CLI without the provenance real releases carried

How it works

  • Typosquatting: a look-alike such as react-native-reanimate next to the real name.
  • Dependency confusion (Birsan, 2021(unverified)): internal acme-utils not on npm → attacker publishes it publicly with a higher version → resolver prefers it. Fix: scoped names (@acme/) mapped to your registry, and own the scope on npm.
  • Install scripts: preinstall/install/postinstall run with your user’s rights on laptops and CI — where the tokens live. That is how worms spread.
  • Provenance: npm publish --provenance (automatic with trusted publishing) signs, via Sigstore, a statement linking the tarball to a repo commit + CI run; npm audit signatures checks it. A new version missing it is a red flag.

Example — lock it down (npm / pnpm)

# .npmrc
ignore-scripts=true               # opt specific deps back in
@acme:registry=https://npm.acme.example/   # no confusion
# CI
npm ci                  # exact lockfile; fails if it drifts
npm audit signatures    # registry signatures + provenance
npm sbom --sbom-format cyclonedx > sbom.json
# pnpm-workspace.yaml  (pnpm 10: dep scripts OFF by default)
minimumReleaseAge: 1440   # minutes; default in pnpm 11
allowBuilds:              # pnpm 11 (was onlyBuiltDependencies)
  esbuild: true

Pinning beyond npm

  • SPM: commit Package.resolved (the Git commit per package + binary checksums); binaryTarget needs a checksum. Xcode fails the build if an XCFramework’s signature changes.
  • CocoaPods: commit Podfile.lock, pod install (not update) in CI. Trunk goes read-only 2 Dec 2026 — move to SPM.
  • Gradle: dependency locking + verification-metadata.xml (checksums / PGP).
  • Bots: Dependabot / Renovate for small, reviewable PRs; Renovate minimumReleaseAge = cooldown.
  • SBOM: CycloneDX (OWASP) or SPDX (ISO/IEC 5962) — answers “are we affected?” in minutes.

npm itself changed (after Sep 2025)

Classic tokens revoked 9 Dec 2025; write tokens are granular, ≤ 90 days (7-day default); 2FA for local publishing, WebAuthn over TOTP; trusted publishing (OIDC from GitHub Actions / GitLab) means no token to steal.

Incident response

Find affected versions in every lockfile and image → did an install run in the window? → treat that machine/runner as compromised: rotate every secret it held → rebuild from clean → pin a safe version → ship, and invalidate bundles built in the window.

Traps

  • “We pin in package.json” — transitive deps still float. The lockfile is the pin, and npm install in CI may rewrite it.
  • npm audit finds known CVEs, not a malicious version published an hour ago.
  • Build-time only? chalk’s payload shipped inside web bundles to end users.
  • Removing the bad version is not recovery — the stolen tokens still work.

Remember

“Pin, delay, don’t execute, verify, inventory — and rotate when it happens.”

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